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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE 0'F UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Respondent, 
-vs.-
I~UBEN B. SANCHEZ, 
Appellant. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case 
No. 9298 
Respondent notes that appellant's statement of fact 
is in reality argumentative in that at page 4 in particu-
lar, and elsewhere, such language as "but no evidence was 
shown to prove she had been raped,'' attempts to state 
the legal implications of testimony. Further, the appel-
lant's statement of fact is not complete and respondent 
shall make reference in the course of its brief to such 
necessary additional facts as are relevant to this appeal. 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
PoiNT I. 
THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE OF 
PENETRATION BEFORE THE JURY TO 
JUSTIFY A VERDICT OF GUILTY, AND THE 
TRIAL COURT COMMITTED NO ERROR IN 
SUBMITTING THE CASE TO THE JURY. 
PoiNT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED NO ERROR 
IN ADMITTING THE TESTIMONY OF DR. 
McENTIRE. 
PoiNT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED NO ERROR 
IN DETERMINING THE PROSECUTRIX TO 
BE A COMPETENT WITNESS, AND IN AD-
MITTING HER TESTIMONY. 
PoiNT IV. 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED NO ERROR 
IN ADMITTING THE TESTIMONY OF AU-
GUST NUSSBAUM, HAROLD GIBBS ANDRE-
BECCA GARCIA, OR IF SUCH ADMISSIONS 
WERE ERROR, SUCH ERROR WAS NOT 
PREJUDICIAL. 
ARGUMENT 
PoiNT I. 
THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE OF 
PENETRATION BEFORE THE JURY TO 
JUSTIFY A VERDICT OF GUILTY, AND THE 
TRIAL COURT COMMITTED NO ERROR IN 
SUBMITTING THE CASE TO THE JURY. 
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In spite of the conceded fact that no motion to 
disn1iHH or motion for directed verdict was made on de-
fendant's behalf at the trial of this action, counsel for 
dPfendant-appellant, under the" palpable error" doctrine 
of the State v. Cabo, 90 Utah 89, 60 P. 2d 92, wishes this 
Court to rule as though some such motion had timely 
been made. 
Assuming either motion had been made, respondent 
contends the trial court would have had no alternative 
but to deny it. This Court has repeatedly announced 
the standard on which such motions are to be considered. 
lYiost recently in the case of State v. Iverson, ______ Utah 
________ , 350 P. 2d 152, this Court, over the signature of 
Justice Callister, said : 
"The law involved is ably discussed in the opin-
ion of Justice Wolfe in State v. Thatcher, 108 
Utah 63, 157 P. 2d 258. The controlling principle 
is that upon such a motion the evidence is to be 
viewed most favorably to the state, and if when so 
viewed, the jury acting fairly and reasonably 
could find the defendant guilty beyond a reason-
able doubt, the judge is required to submit the case 
to the jury for determination of the guilt or inno-
cence of defendant." 
In the case of State v. Penderville, 2 U. 2d 281, 272 
P. 2d 195, the court said : 
'' * * * It has been repeatedly held by this court 
that upon a motion to dismiss or to direct a verdict 
of not guilty for lack of evidence that the trial 
court does not consider the weight of the evidence 
or credibility of the witnesses, but determines the 
naked legal proposition of law, whether there is 
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any substantial evidence of the guilt of the 
accused, and all reasonable inferences are to be 
taken in favor of the state. * * * (Cases cited) 
... l\_s is pointed out in one or more of these cases, 
the trial court has a discretion in the case of a 
motion for a new trial that it does not have in case 
of a motion to dismiss or to direct a verdict of not 
guilty. Nevertheless, in either case if there is be-
fore the court evidence upon which reasonable 
men might differ as to whether the defendant is or 
is not guilty, he may deny the motion." 
In the case of State v. Lewellyn, 71 Utah 331, 366 
Pac. 261, an adultery prosecution where defendant made 
a motion for a directed verdict, which motion is equiva-
lent to the motion to dismiss under consideration here, 
the court said : 
"In 16 C. J. 935, the conclusions of various courts 
are condensed in the statement: 
'' 'As a general rule the court should direct a ver-
dict of acquittal * * * where there is no competent 
evidence reasonably tending to sustain the charge; 
or were the evidence is undisputed and so weak 
that a conviction would be attributable to passion 
or prejudice, or where it is so. slight and indeter-
minate that a verdict of guilty would be set a.side, 
as where the evidence consists solely of the uncor-
roborated testimony of an accomplice, or is insuffi-
cient to overcome the preumption of innocence, or 
to show defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt. But the case should be submitted to the jury 
and the court should not direct a verdict of acquit-
tal, if there is any evidence to support or reason-
ably tending to support the charge, as where it is 
sufficient to overcome prima facie the presumption 
of innocence, or where the evidence of a material 
nature is conflicting.' 
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''From Pace v. Commonwealth, 170 Ky. 560, 186 
S.W. 142, we quote the syllabus on this point as 
follows: 
'' 'It is only in the absence of any evidence tending 
to establish the guilt of the accused that the trial 
court will be authorized to grant a peremptory in-
struction directing his acquittal.' 
''The same principle is decided in State v. Gross, 
Ohio St. 161, 110 N.E. 466. 
''An able discussion and determination of the 
bounds of judicial authority in considering a mo-
tion for a directed verdict is contained in Isbell v. 
U.S. 142 C.C.A. 312, 227 F. 788, in which it is made 
clear that the court in such case does not consider 
the weight of evidence or credibility of witnesses 
but determines the naked legal proposition of law 
whether there is any substantial evidence of the 
guilt of the accused. This is undoubtedly the cor-
rect rule. See annotation 'Directing Acquittal,' 
17 A.L.R. 910. The function of a court in dealing 
with an application for a directed verdict must not 
be confused with that in considering a motion for 
a new trial upon the grounds of insufficiency of 
evidence. The court has a discretion in the latter 
case which he does not properly have in the for-
mer. The reason for the distinction is that the 
order sought in one case acquits the accused and 
finally ends the prosecution, while in the other, 
the order, if granted, does not discharge the 
accused but merely gives him the advantage and 
benefit of another trial. The rule is controlled 
by the same principles in criminal cases as in civil 
procedure. And in a civil case, Starn v. Ogden 
P. & P. Co., 53 Utah 248, 177 P. 218, this court· 
said: 
" 'It is familiar doctrine in this jurisdiction and 
perhaps in nearly every other where the jury sys-
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tern prevails, that, if there is any substantial evi-
dence whatever upon which to base a verdict, the 
court will not withdraw the case from the jury or 
direct what their verdict should be.' " 
In the case at bar there is ''substantial evidence'' of 
penetration from which the jury could properly have 
returned a verdict of guilty. The prosecuting witness 
testified about two specific events of intercourse. Coun-
sel for appellant, in his brief, cites part of the testimony 
relating to each event. The entire testimony of the prose-
cuting witness regarding the same follows: 
''Q. Now you tell us what happened then. 
A. Well, I had a dress on, and he tore it off me. 
And then he put me on the bed, and he got on 
top of me, and he put his penis in me. 
Q. What do you mean by that~ Would you tell 
me what you mean by that~ Could you tell us 
what he did to you Y 
A. Well, he got his penis, and put it between my 
legs. 
Q. Pardon me~ 
A. He put his penis between my legs. 
Q. And then what did he do~ 
A. Then he went up and down. 
Q. And do you know \Yhether he was- You say 
that he put it inside of you. How do you know 
it was inside of you, Beverly~ 
A. Because it hurt. 
Q. And tell us what happened then~ 
A. Well, he went up and do\Yn on me, and it hurt. 
I was screaming, and \Yhen he got through 
there wa.s something sticky between my legs. 
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Q. Did you tell your mother about this~ 
A. No. I was too scared. 
Q. Now what did Ruben Sanchez do then? After 
you felt the sticky between your legs, what 
happened then? 
A. Well, then he done it for awhile, and he got 
through and he put his clothes on and he went 
out, and he told me to don't tell. 
Q. He told you what~ 
A. He told me to don't tell. And I said okay, so 
then he unlocked the doors and he went out. 
Q. Now did you see Ruben Sanchez again, after 
this first day~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. And tell us if you ever saw Ruben Sanchez 
again at your home, when your mother wasn't 
there. 
A. Well, she went out, and he came over again, 
and he brought some men. 
THE CouRT: Brought some what~ 
THE WITNESS: Men. 
THE CouRT: Men~ 
THE WITNEss: Yes. 
MR. NEWEY: Q. What happened then~ 
A. Well, they came in our house. And me and 
my sister, we were cleaning the house up, and 
he brought the men in, and they took my sister, 
they were taking turns with her, and Ruben 
Sanchez was with me in the other room. 
Q. Tell me now - particularly with you, if you 
would, Beverly - what did Ruben Sanchez do 
to you at that particular time ~ 
A. Well, he took me in the other room and put me 
on the bed, and told me to take my clothes off, 
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and I wouldn't, so he pulled up my dress and 
pulled down my pants, and he took his clothes 
off, and I was screaming and I wouldn't let 
him, so then he kept doing it to me. He opened 
my legs. 
Q. He kept what~ 
A. He kept doing it to me. He opened up my legs, 
and put his penis in me. 
Q. And would you tell us what he did then 1 
A. Then he went up and down on me. 
Q. He did what? 
A. He went up and down on me. 
Q. All right. 
A_. And I was screaming it hurt, so kept d_~¥ it. 
When he got through it hurt, and ;fie got 
through he put his clothes on and he went in 
the other room, and he told me and sister to 
don't tell. When the other men got through 
with my sister, he told me and my sister to 
don't tell. When the men was through with 
my sister.'' (R. 19-21) 
On cross-examination the prosecuting witness was 
asked: 
"Q. Now you told us, Beverly, that Mr. Sanchez 
was inside of you. Are you sure that he was 
inside of you 1 
A. Yes. 
Q. Now are you sure that it was Mr. Sanchez and 
not one of the other men that was inside of you 1 
A. It was Mr. Sanchez. 
Q. Do you remember for a certainty 1 
A. Yes." (R. 30) 
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As cited by appellant in his brief, Section 76-53-17, 
U.C.A. 1953 provides: 
''Any sexual penetration, however slight, is 
sufficient to complete the crime.'' 
While this section has never been formally construed by 
this Court, a similar statute of almost identical words in 
the State of Washington was construed in the case of 
State v. Snyder, 91 P. 2d 570, wherein the court said: 
'' * * * Some statutes expressly provide that any 
sexual penetration, however slight, is sufficient to 
complete the crime, and such a provision applies 
to all the subdivisions of a statute defining the 
offense. And, generally, it is not necessary that 
the penetration should be perfect, the slightest 
penetration of the body of the female by the sexual 
organ of the male being sufficient; nor need there 
be an entering of the vagina or rupturing of the 
hymen; the entering of the vulva or labia is suf-
ficient.'' 
The prosecuting witness's testimony, if believed, in-
dicates the defendant was ''inside'' her and it ''hurt.'' 
This testimony was supplemented by the testimony of Dr. 
McEntire to the effect that sexual intercourse with an· 
adult male of average maturity and size would have 
been possible with this girl. (R. 38-39) 
PoiNT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED NO ERROR 
IN ADMITTING THE TESTIMONY OF DR. 
McENTIRE. 
Appellant in his brief seems to argue that because 
Dr. McEntire did not testify the prosecuting witness 
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had been ''raped,'' his testimony was, therefore, irrele-
vant and prejudicial. The word "rape" to appellant ap-
parently means the act of intercourse, accompanied with 
force and resistance, and that unless evidence showing re-
sistance or lack of consent and force, the crime has not 
been completed in spite of the fact that counsel cites, as 
noted above, the applicable statute with regard to pene-
tration alone constituting the crime. Appellant further 
contends that because the State, through the testimony 
of Dr. McEntire, failed to show such force and resis-
tance, it has failed to meet its burden of proof. As the 
statute indicates, the crime is complete upon a showing 
of the act of intercourse, entirely independent of consent, 
force or resistance, when perpetrated on a female under 
the age of 13 years (76-53-15 [1], U.C.A. 1953), and, 
as indicated above, any penetration, however slight, is 
sufficient demonstration of the act. 
Clearly, Dr. McEntire's testimony ran solely to the 
question of possibility of penetration. This is clearly 
relevant and was accordingly properly admitted. In the 
Snyder case cited above, the court notes that expert testi-
mony of doctors was introduced in that trial to show that 
the prosecuting witness's hymen "\Yas not punctured, but 
the court upheld a conviction on the ground that sufficient 
penetration of the labia. was demonstrated to justify a 
guilty verdict from the jury. Since expert testimony tend-
ing to show lack of penetration is admissible, so also 
should expert testimony tending to sho"\Y possibility of 
penetration be admissible. The trial court committed 
no error, therefore, in admitting Dr. McEntire's 
testimony. 
10 
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PoiNT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED NO ERROR 
IN DETERMINING THE PROSECUTRIX TO 
BE A COMPETENT WITNESS, AND IN AD-
~IITTING HER TESTIMONY. 
1\.t Points IV, V and VII of his brief, appellant argues 
that the testimony of Beverly Garcia, the complaining 
\vitness, was inadmissible in its entirety for two reasons, 
(1) that she was not a competent witness, and (2) that 
she did not sufficiently understand the questions. Further, 
appellant maintains certain specific testimony by this 
'vitness should have been precluded relating to other 
offenses committed by other parties than defendant at 
the time of the offense charged. These three points shall 
be answered under the above heading. 
(A) Counsel for appellant cites the case of State v. 
Zeezich, 61 Utah 61, 210 Pac. 927, in support of his posi-
tion that the prosecutrix in this case was incompetent to 
testify. As a rna tter of fact, the Zeezich case holds exactly 
to the contrary. In that opinion, rendered by Justice 
Thurman, the court enunciated the established rule 1n 
this jurisdiction in the following language: 
''The authorities are practically uniform to the 
effect that the admission of testimony in cases of 
this kind is within the sound discretion of the trial 
court, and that its decision in such cases will not 
be reversed unless there is a manifest abuse of 
discretion. Such has been the holding of this court 
in many decisions heretofore rendered. State v. 
Blythe, 20 Utah, 379, 58 Pac. 1108; State v. M.or-
asco, 42 Utah 5, 128 Pac. 571; State v. Macmillan, 
46 Utah, 19, 145 Pac. 833. There are no decisions 
11 
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to the contrary in this jurisdiction. Besides hold-
ing that the question of competency is within the 
discretion of the trial court, these cases hold that, 
not age, but mental capacity, is the test of 
competency. 
"In State v. Blythe, supra, at page 380 of 20 Utah, 
at page 1108 of 58 Pac., it is said: 
" 'Not age, but capability of receiving just im-
pressions of facts and of relating them truly, are 
the tests of competency, under the statute' 
''In State v. Morasco, supra, the court states the 
rule as follows : 
'' 'If the child has the mental capacity to under-
stand the obligations of an oath- that is, appre-
ciates the difference between truth and falsehood 
- is sensible of the impropriety of telling a false-
hood, and that it is his duty to tell the truth, and 
is capable of receiving just impressions of the 
facts of which he is to testify, and has the 
ability to relate them correctly, he is a competent 
witness.' 
''In State v. Macmillan, supra, a case in which 
the offense charged and the age of the child were 
the same as in the case at bar, the court, speaking 
of the discretion vested in the trial court, at page 
22 of 46 Utah, at page 834 of 145 Pac., says: 
''It is next contended that the district court erred 
in receiving the testimony of the little girl, with 
whose person the indecent liberties were taken, 
and who testified in behalf of the state, upon the 
ground that she by reason of her youth and want 
of comprehension of the solemnity of an oath, was 
incompetent to testify. The question of the com-
petency of a child who is called as a witness, in 
the very nature of things, must to a large extent 
at least, be left to the sound discretion of the trial 
12 
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court. When that court has passed upon the ques-
tion either way, we cannot interfere, unless it is 
clearly made to appea.r that the court abused the 
discretion vested in it." (Emphasis added) 
Reading the record at pages 15 through 18, there is 
certainly no apparent abuse of discretion on the part of 
the trial court. At the conclusion, the court said : 
"I think she's qualified to testify. You may go 
ahead." (R. 18) 
No objection was made at the time of the trial as to 
this witness's competency, and from a reading of the 
witness's entire testimony (R. 15-32), it is apparent that 
she had sufficient mental capacity "to receive just im-
pressions of the facts and the ability to relate them 
correctly.'' 
(B) Counsel for appellant maintains, because of a 
supposed specific example cited showing lack of com-
prehension in the witness, that the entire testimony of 
Beverly Garcia should be excluded. In the example cited 
by appellant, however, it is apparent the witness, while 
not understanding the first question posed, upon its being 
re-phrased, understood and responded to the question. 
Again a reading of the entire testimony of this wit-
ness shows a coherence, capacity to understand and a 
rational relating of the facts requested. The fact that a 
given question may have needed to be re-phrased for 
this 10-year-old girl is certainly no ground for error in 
and of itself. As to all material facts, this witne-ss's tes-
13 
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timony was unequivocal and coherent and responsive to 
the questions. 
No objection was made at the time of trial by de-
fendant's counsel that this witness was failing to under-
stand the questions, and clearly, counsel at the time of 
trial had much better opportunity to observe the wit-
ness's behavior, demeanor and capacity than does this 
Court or appellate counsel. There is nothing in the record 
in the absence of objection to give rise to the "palpable 
error'' doctrine relied on by appellant. 
(C) Appellant further contends that the testimony 
of the prosecutrix with regard to commission of similar 
crimes by friends of defendant on prosecutrix's sister, 
was prejudicial and should have been precluded by the 
court. 
A reading of the record, beginning at page 20, shows 
the witness testified the defendant "brought some men" 
with him, and that, further, "he brought the men in, and 
they took my sister, they were taking turns with her and 
Ruben Sanchez was ·w-ith me in the other room.'' Later 
she testified : 
''When he got through it hurt, and \Yhen he got 
through he put his clothes on and he went in the 
other room and he told me and my sister to don't 
tell. When the other men got through with my 
sister, he told me and my sister to don't tell. When 
the men was through with my sister." 
14 
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On eross-examination, defendant's own counsel 
asked: 
"}[R. PHILLIPS: Q. Did you say prior to this time 
- earlier, at the preliminary hearing, when we 
\vere talking - did you mention that the men that 
cnn1c in with Mr. Sanchez also had relations with 
~·on, or did this same thing to you as Mr. Sanchez 
has done1 Do you understand what I'm asking 
you~ 
A. Yes. Yes, they done it. 
Q. They did it to you, too 1 
A. Yes. 
Q. And when did they do this to you, Beverly1 Do 
you remember 1 
A. It's between the 4th of July and the 24th of 
July. 
Q. Now is this the same time that you have spoken 
about Mr. Sanchez doing the same thing to you~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. I see. Now how many times did those other men 
do this to you 1 Do you remember 1 
.A .. No. 
Q. Do you remember the times that they did it1 
Were they there at any time that Mr. Sanchez 
was not there~ 
.A .. No. 
Q. They were only there when Mr. Sanchez was 
there~ 
.A .• Yes. 
Q. Now then, was Mr. Sanchez there at any time 
that they were not there~ Did he come alone at 
any time~ 
A. Yes. 
15 
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Q. He came alone at other times~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. Now are you absolutely sure, Beverly, that it 
was Mr. Sanchez that did these things to you, 
and not some other man~ 
A. Yes.'' 
(R. 26-27) 
'' Q. Now are you sure that it was Mr. Sanchez, 
and not one of the other men, that was inside 
of you~ 
A. It was Mr. Sanchez. 
Q. Do you remember for a certainty~ 
A. Yes.'' 
(R. 30) 
No objection was made by defendant's counsel at the 
time this first testimony was elicited on direct examina-
tion. It appears further that such testimony was part of a 
description of the entire res gestae. It was well within the 
bounds of propriety and relevancy in describing who was 
present and what others were doing in the witness' pres-
ence at the time of the acts of the defendant. 
Defense counsel, in fact, on cross-examination, fur-
ther inquired into the matter with the apparent hope of 
getting the prosecutrix confused as to whoilf had per-
petrated the acts upon her. Having elected to explore 
that possibility, appellant should not now be free to argue 
that such testimony, which his own counsel helped elicit, 
was inadmissible and should never have been permitted. 
PoiNT IV. 
TilE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED NO ERROR 
IN ADMITTING THE TESTIMONY OF AU-
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GUST NUSSBAUM, HAROLD GIBBS ANDRE-
BECCA GARCIA, OR IF SUCH ADMISSIONS 
WERE ERROR, SUCH ERROR WAS NOT 
PREJUDICIAL. 
At Points III, VI and VIII in his brief, appellant ob-
jects to the admission of the testimony of Captain August 
Nussbaum, Harold Gibbs and Rebecca Garcia, the com-
plaining witness's mother. 
(A) With regard to the testimony of Captain Nuss-
baum, the record discloses at pages 45 through 47 that 
this witness testified concerning conversations had with 
the defendant. Counsel for defendant twice objected that 
such conversations were hearsay. On both occasions the 
court overruled the objection. Counsel for appellant now 
insists that such conversations and statements by defend-
ant were hearsay or, if not hearsay, were admissions 
which do not meet five elements requisite according to 
Wharton on Criminal Evidence. 
A reading of the testimony shows that the defendant 
\Yas interrogated as to his acquaintance with the com-
plaining witness and her mother and with their home. 
He at first denied any acquaintance with them or knowl-
edge of the home, and thereafter admitted knowing both 
the complaining witness and her mother, and further ad-
mitted being in the home in company of other Spanish 
men. This testimony is patently an admission, and the 
only objection possibly available to defendant had he 
raised it would be the question of voluntariness of such 
admissions. Foundation for such testimony was in fact 
laid (R. 45), and no objection either to the foundation or 
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voluntariness was proffered by defense counsel. In fact, 
on cross-examination of Captain Nussbaum counsel for 
defense reiterated that his client admitted knowing the 
complaining witness, having been in the home with her 
in company of others, and emphasized that the defendant 
denied "having done anything to the little girl." 
The defendant later elected to take the stand, and 
on direct examination admitted virtually the same facts 
in his own testimony. (R. 49 and 50) On cross-examina-
tion the defendant further admitted this conversation 
with Captain Nussbaum and corroborated substantially 
what the Captain had testified. (R. 53 through 55) The 
jury, therefore, would h~ve had the same facts out of 
defendant's own mouth, even though this witness's testi-
mony had been precluded. Therefore, defendant-appellant 
was not prejudiced thereby. 
(B) The testimony of the witness, Harold Gibbs, did 
no more than connect, for the benefit of the jury, the 
events in the life of the prosecuting witness from the 
time she was living with her mother until she was placed 
in the foster home where she was residing at the time of 
the trial. 
Section 77-42-1, U.C.A. 1953, provides that the 
commission of error by the trial court will not be pre-
sumed to have resulted in prejudice unless it affects the 
substantial rights of the parties. See State v. Neal, ------
Utah ________ , 262 P. 2d 756. Clearly, this testimony does 
not affect the substantial rights of the defendant. In-
deed, counsel for appellant does not so complain but 
argues only tha.t the testimony was irrelevant, imma-
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terial and improper, and tended to provoke sympathy for 
the vietim, and for these reasons was prejudicial. 
..L\s indicated in the Neal case cited above, the test 
of prejudicial error seems to be : Would the result have 
been otherwise had the testimony not been admitted~ 
Clearly in this instance the absence of the testimony of 
Harold Gibbs would not, indeed, could not, have effected 
the verdict. 
(C) Appellant further objects to the admission of 
the testimony of Rebecca Garcia, the mother of the com-
plaining witness. Appellant argues that because in re-
~ponse to one question the witness hazarded an opinion, 
to-,vit: ''and those times I think he was at the house,'' 
the entire testimony of the witness should have been 
disallowed. While it may have been that this answer 
might well have been objectionable, no objection was 
timely made and, hence, no error for the same can now 
be claimed. Even, however, if such an objection had 
been made, quite clearly this answer, in and of itself, 
could hardly be said to be so inflammatory or prejudicial 
as to have affected the substantial rights of the defend-
ant sufficient to constitute reversible error. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, respondent respectfully 
requests this Court to affirm the decision of the trial 
court. 
WALTER L. BUDGE 
Attorney General 
GORDON A. MADSEN 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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